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Abstract
Taking France as a case study, this article reflects on the ongoing legalisation strategies pursued by liberal states as they seek
to secure and expand the Internet surveillance programs of their domestic and foreign intelligence agencies. Following the
path to legalisation prior and after the Snowden disclosures of 2013, the article shows how post-Snowden controversies
helped mobilise advocacy groups against the extra judicial surveillance of Internet communications, a policy area which
had hitherto been overlooked by French human rights groups. It also points to the dilemma that post-Snowden contention
created for governments. On the one hand, the disclosures helped document the growing gap between the existing legal
framework and actual surveillance practices, exposing them to litigation and thereby reinforcing the rationale for legalisa-
tion. On the other hand, they made such a legislative reform politically risky and unpredictable. In France, policy-makers
navigated these constraints through a cautious mix of silence, denials, and securitisation. After the Paris attacks of January
2015 and a hasty deliberation in Parliament, the Intelligence Act was passed, making it the most extensive piece of legisla-
tion ever adopted in France to regulate secret state surveillance. The article concludes by pointing to the paradoxical effect
of post-Snowden contention: French law now provides for clear rules authorising large-scale surveillance, to a degree of
detail that was hard to imagine just a few years ago.
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1. Introduction
In January 2008, a meeting took place in the office of
then President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, at the Élysée
Palace. In front of him sat Prime Minister François Fillon
and the Director of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité
Extérieure (DGSE, France’s foreign intelligence agency)
Pierre Brochand, as well as a few of their staff.
Brochandhad comewith a plea. France, he explained,
was on the verge of losing the Internet surveillance arms
race. From the 1980’s on, French intelligence services
had managed to develop top notch communications in-
telligence (COMINT) capabilities, thanks to a network
of intercept stations located across metropolitan France
and overseas territories, sometimes in partnership with
the German Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND. But as al-
most all of the world’s communications were now travel-
ling on IP based networks, the DGSE was losing ground
on its main partners and competitors—in particular the
National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Govern-
ment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
France had some serious catching up to do, but it also
had important assets. First, its geographic location, with
almost two dozen submarine cables landing on its shores,
both in Brittany, Normandy and the Marseilles area. Sec-
ond, its engineering elite state schools and high tech
firms—not least of which submarine cable operators
Alcatel and Orange as well as surveillance technology
provider Qosmos—, which could provide the technical
know-how necessary to carry on this ambitious project.
Sarkozy was hesitant at first. The plan was very costly
and its legality more than dubious. The French legal ba-
sis for communications surveillance dated back to 1991.
Another issue was that of cost. At the time, the 2008 fi-
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nancial crisis had yet to unleash, but the governmentwas
already facing recurring deficits and it needed to contain
public spending.
But Pierre Brochand and its supporters in the Pres-
ident’s staff turned out to be convincing. Sarkozy even-
tually agreed to move forward with the proposed plan:
Over the course of the next five years, the DGSE would
get the €700million it needed to upgrade its surveillance
capabilities and hire over 600 staff to work in its Techni-
cal Directorate (the number of DGSE employeeswas then
4,440). Only six months later, near Marseilles, the first of
the new intercept stations was up and running, doubling
up the traffic coming from international cables, filtering
it and transmitting it to the DGSE’s headquarters in Paris.
How do we even know about this meeting? We owe
this account to journalist Vincent Jauvert, who revealed
its existence in a French weekly magazine on July 1st
2015, at the very end of the parliamentary debate on
the 2015 Intelligence Bill (Jauvert, 2015). According to
former high ranking officials quoted by Jauvert, these ef-
forts paid off: “When we turned on the faucet, it was
a shock! All this information, it was unbelievable!” All
of sudden, France was back in the game. To such an ex-
tent that, a few months later, in 2009, the NSA even of-
fered to make the DGSE a member of the exclusive Five
Eyes club.
Apparently, the “Sixth Eye” deal failed over the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) refusal to conclude a no-
spy agreement with France, and in 2011, a more mod-
est cooperation was eventually signed between the NSA
and the DGSE under the form of a memorandum—most
likely the so-called LUSTRE agreement revealed in 2013
by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden (Follorou, 2013).
Another agreement was struck in November 2010 with
the British GCHQ.
Jauvert’s report connected many pieces of informa-
tion of what was—and still remains—a puzzle. By then,
a few public statements by intelligence officials had al-
ready hinted at the formidable growth of the DGSE’s
Internet surveillance capabilities. The Snowden docu-
ments and a handful of investigative reports had also
given evidence of France’s rank in the world of COMINT.
However, for the first time,wewere able to get a sense of
some of the political intricacies and secret negotiations
that presided over the rise of the most significant Inter-
net surveillance program developed by French agencies,
as well as their geopolitical outcomes.
But his report also raised questions: If the plan
agreed upon at the Élysée Palace in January 2008 was so
successful, why did the new French administration wait
until the Spring of 2015 to “go public” by presenting the
Intelligence Bill aimed at legalising this large-scale surveil-
lance program?
The goal of this paper—adapted from a longer re-
search report (Tréguer, 2016a)—is to study the process
of legalisation of Internet surveillance capabilities, tak-
ing France as a case study to analyse the impact of post-
Snowden contention on the techno-legal apparatus of
surveillance, one that has become deeply embedded in
the daily routine of security professionals in domestic
and transnational security fields.
To provide an empirical analysis of this process of
legalisation, the article uses the methodological tool-
box of contentious politics, a sub-field of political soci-
ology (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). It first looks at historical
antecedents of legalisation and contention around com-
munications surveillance in France. By providing a con-
tent analysis of recent investigative reports and policy
documents to shed light on a policy domain veiled in se-
crecy, the paper points to the growing gap between se-
cret surveillance practices and the law prior to the Snow-
den disclosures of 2013. It then turns to the impact of
these leaks and the resulting episodes of contention for
the strengthening of privacy advocacy in France, its chill-
ing effect on legalisation, as well as the role of the ter-
rorist threat and associated processes of securitisation
in the adoption of the Intelligence Act of 2015.
While calling for cross-country comparisons of intel-
ligence reforms passed by liberal regimes since 2013,
this case study concludes by suggesting that, rather
than helping restore the rule of law, post-Snowden con-
tentionmight paradoxically contribute to reinforcing illib-
eral trends towards the circumvention of procedural and
substantive human rights safeguards, while strengthen-
ing the executive power’s ability to “rule by law” (Tarrow,
2015, p. 162).
2. Before Snowden, Legalisation Was Underway
As many of its counterparts, France has a record of
surveillance scandals. In 1974, a project by the Interior
Ministry—aimed at building a huge database gathering
as much information as possible on its citizens—sparked
a huge outcry, after an unidentified engineer working on
the project blew the whistle by speaking to the press
(Joinet, 2013). The “SAFARI affair”, named after the co-
dename of the project, played an important role in the
adoption of the French personal data protection frame-
work in 1978 (Fuster, 2014).
2.1. The Wiretapping Act of 1991: An Antecedent of
Legalisation
In 1991, following two condemnations by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) pointing to the lack of de-
tailed provision surrounding both judicial and administra-
tive wiretaps, the government rushed to Parliament to
pass the Wiretapping Act, which provided the first com-
prehensive legal framework regulating the surveillance
of telephone communications (Errera, 2003).
In the early 1990’s, the prospect of Internet surveil-
lance was of course still very distant, and the law was
drafted with landline and wireless (satellite in particu-
lar) telephone communications in mind. So when tap-
ping into Internet traffic became an operational neces-
sity for intelligence agencies at the end of the 1990’s, its
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legal basis was progressively hinged on secret and exten-
sive interpretations of existing provisions (one notable
exception was a 2006 statute which authorised adminis-
trative access to metadata records for the sole purpose
of anti-terrorism) (Tréguer, 2016b). Such was the case of
the DGSE’s large-scale Internet surveillance programme
launched in 2008, and apparently backed by a provision
of the 1991 Wiretapping Act that gave a blank check
to the DGSE to conduct bulk interceptions of so-called
“Hertzian transmissions” without any oversight.
French officials looking back at these developments
have often resorted to euphemisms, talking about a zone
of “a-legality” to describe this secret creep in surveillance
capabilities (e.g. Follorou & Johannès, 2013). Although
“a-legality” may be used to characterise the legal grey
areas in which citizens operate to exert and claim new
rights that have yet to be sanctioned by either the parlia-
ment or the courts—for instance the disclosure of huge
swathes of digital documents (Tréguer, 2015)—it cannot
adequately qualify these instances of legal tinkering by
secret bureaucracies that seek to escape the safeguards
associatedwith the rule of law. Indeed,when the state in-
terferes with civil rights like privacy and freedom of com-
munication, a detailed, public and proportionate legal ba-
sis authorising them to do so is required by supranational
courts like the ECHR. Otherwise, such interferences are,
quite plainly, illegal.
2.2. Legal Insecurity as a Driver for Legalisation
Secret legal interpretations are, of course, a common fea-
ture in the field of surveillance (Rubinstein, Nojeim, &
Lee, 2014), and the extralegal regulation of Internet com-
munications has become increasingly common among
liberal regimes (Benkler, 2011; Tréguer, 2015). In France,
as we will see, they could prosper all the more easily
given the shortcomings of human rights advocacy against
Internet surveillance. But even so, French national secu-
rity policy-makers began toworry that the existing frame-
work failed to comply with the standards of the ECHR.
In July 2008, six months after the launch of the
DGSE’s large-scale Internet surveillance program, the
government released the White Paper of Defence and
National Security—a major effort of strategic planning
conducted under Sarkozy’s presidency. This official policy
document claimed, for what appears to be the first time,
that intelligence legislation would soon be presented
to Parliament:
Intelligence activities do not have the benefit of a
clear and sufficient legal framework. This shortcom-
ing must be corrected. A new legal architecture will
define the duties of intelligence agencies, safeguards
for both their personnel and human sources, as well
as overarching rules for the protection of classified in-
formation. Legislative amendments will be provided,
while respecting the balance between the protection
of civil rights, the effectiveness of judicial proceedings
and the protection of secrecy. (French Government,
2008, p. 142)
The document added that “the consultation of metadata
and administrative databases…will be enlarged”.
But the following September, a major scandal
erupted around the adoption of a decree authorising a
very broad intelligence database—named EDVIGE—for
domestic surveillance purposes. Within a few weeks, a
widespread civil society mobilisation against the decree
led the government to backtrack (Marzouki, 2009). It
marked one of the biggest episodes of human rights
contention under Sarkozy’s presidency and was appar-
ently enough to put the government’s broader plans
for modernising intelligence law to rest until the end of
its mandate.
What a conservative, “tough-on-security” govern-
ment could not achievewould eventually be pursued and
carried out by a left-of-center, supposedly pro civil rights
party. By the time the Socialist Party returned to power
in 2012, its officials in charge of security affairs were the
ones pushing for a sweeping reform that would legally
secure the work of people in the intelligence community
and, incidentally, put France in line with democratic stan-
dards (which require a public and detailed legal basis for
the surveillance activities of intelligence agencies).
One man played an important role in this process:
Jean-Jacques Urvoas, a long-time proponent of intelli-
gence reform in the Socialist Party, who became Minister
of Justice in early 2016. After the 2012 elections, Urvoas
was re-elected to the National Assembly and awarded
with the prestigious position of President of the Commit-
tee on Legal Affairs. This also made him a de facto mem-
ber of the Parliament’s Committee on Intelligence, sealing
his membership to the small circle of intelligence policy-
makers. Mid-May 2013—just two weeks before the first
Guardian article based on the Snowden files—, Urvoas
presented a 200-page-long bipartisan report on the “evo-
lution of the legal framework of intelligence services” (Ur-
voas & Verchère, 2013). In one section entitled “Tomor-
row, a Condemnation by the ECHR?”, the report provided
an overview of the court’s case law and insisted that:
In France, for lack of legislation adapted to certain
aspects of their activities, intelligence services are
forced to act outside of any legal framework…. The in-
terception of communication, the listening of places
and the tapping of images violate the right to private
life, as do the geo-localisation of a phone or of a vehi-
cle…. Concretely, France is risking a condemnation by
the European Court of Human Rights for violating the
European Convention on Human Rights. For the time
being, no legal challenge has been introduced against
intelligence-related activities, but there is a constant
risk of condemnation. (p. 31)
Recalling the ECHR 1990 rulings against France, the sec-
tion ended with an invitation to engage in an intelligence
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reformbasedon a careful analysis of the ECHR case law in
the field of secret surveillance. But despite this acknowl-
edgement that intelligence agencies had been engaging
in illegal surveillance, there was no reaction from human
rights groups.
3. After Snowden, Legalisation Sparked Contention
While the global anti-surveillance contention unleashed
by Snowden reinforced intelligence policy-makers’ ratio-
nale for legalisation by documenting surveillance prac-
tices to litigation, it alsomade such reformmore exposed
to public scrutiny and therefore politically riskier. How-
ever, probably comforted by the fact that French privacy
advocates had traditionally overlooked the issue of Inter-
net surveillance, policy-makers nevertheless gave it a try.
In late 2013, a first attempt at partial legalisation was in-
troduced, eventually giving rise to new alliances among
advocacy groups.
3.1. Initial (Lack of) Contention
Initially, the reaction of the French civil society to the
Snowden disclosures—the first of which appeared in a
Guardian article on June 5th 2013—was relatively mild.
Like in the US, the UK, Germany, and other countries,
there was of course widespread media coverage of the
Snowden affair in June, July and August of that year (see
Figure 1).
Many French Non Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) active in the field of human rights joined the me-
dia frenzy. Some international organisations with pres-
ence in France, like Amnesty or Human Rights Watch,
were able to get traction from the initiatives launched
elsewhere, occupying the French public sphere by trans-
lating press releases targeting the US and the UK agen-
cies. Digital rights organisations working on the overhaul
of the EU framework for data protection, like La Quadra-
ture du Net (LQDN), mentioned Snowden in passing in
their public communications on the matter, but because
they were busy working on the proposed EU regulation
on data protection, they targeted the data collection
practices of Internet firms rather than state surveillance
(LQDN, 2013). The only notable exception to this relative
apathy was the Fédération Internationale des Droits de
l’Homme (FIDH), the worldwide movement for human
rights founded in 1922, which filed a criminal complaint
against NSA’s PRISM program and appealed to the UN
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, calling
for an investigation into the facts revealed by Snowden
(FIDH, 2013).
However, despite the recent Urvoas report hinting
at the discrepancy between surveillance practices of
French agencies and the law, none of these groups
sought to turn the Snowden scandal into an opportunity
to call, say, for an independent review of the DGSE’s capa-
bilities, or bring new privacy safeguards to a legal frame-
work that was visibly outdated. How can we explain such
lack of substantive contention?
3.2. Denials as Legitimisation Strategies
For one, even in activist circles, there was a feeling that
the whole affair was mostly related to the NSA and the
GCHQ, not to French agencies. In this regard, the legit-
imation strategies of policy-makers, which denied that
French agencies were engaging in the same practices as
their Five Eyes counterparts—a strategy also observed
in Germany (Schulze, 2015)—, were successful. But even
more than denials, it was a no-comment policy that dom-
inated the French government’s response to the unfold-
ing scandal.
One notable exception to this wall of communica-
tion was Urvoas. On June 12th, in Le Monde, the then-
member of Parliament refuted that French agencies
were conducting large-scale surveillance of Internet com-
munications, claiming:
I have never heard of tools that could be associated
to what the Americans use, and every time I asked
intelligence officials, I got a negative answer. (Cha-
puis, 2013)
But twoweeks later, on July 4th, LeMonde ran apiece by re-
porter Jacques Follorou on the “French Big Brother”, claim-
ing that France was “doing the same thing” as the NSA:
Le Monde is able to reveal the General Directorate
for External Security (DGSE, special services) system-
atically collects electromagnetic signals coming from
computers or telephones in France, as well as traf-
fic between French and foreigners: the totality of our
communications is being spied upon. All emails, SMS,
telephone records, connections to Facebook, Twitter,
are then stored for years. (Follorou & Johannès, 2013)
The report also quoted a high-ranking intelligence official
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Figure 1. Number of sentences per day mentioning the term “Snowden” in national online news sources in France (based
on 129 media sources) from June 2013 to January 2014. Source: MediaMeter.
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grey area) rather than illegal (for lack of any public and
detailed legal basis).
Considering what we now know about the DGSE’s
Internet surveillance programs and given also the pro-
vision of the 1991 Wiretapping Act allowing bulk col-
lection of wireless communications, the article could
have triggered a new scandal, directly aimed at French
agencies. But because its sensationalist tone and several
inaccuracies—most importantly the fact that it was tech-
nically infeasible for the DGSE to collect the “totality” of
French communications—, it appeared overblown and
was easily dismissed.
Once again, Urvoas was one of the only officials to
comment. He immediately published a blog post refuting
these allegations, using what would become a favoured
metaphor in intelligence circles to distinguish French
agencies from the NSA:
In comparison to the NSA, a technical agency dedi-
cated only to interceptions, the DGSE is a non-spe-
cialised agency collecting intelligence for the sole pur-
pose of complyingwith its regulatory duties.We could
thus say that, against the ’fishing trawls’ that the
NSA seems to be operating, the DGSE is conduct-
ing “harpoon fishing” as part of its prerogatives. (Ur-
voas, 2013a)
But the dismissal of Le Monde’s account did not only
come from policy-makers. Jean Marc Manach, a jour-
nalist, surveillance expert and privacy advocate, also
bemoaned the paranoid tone of Le Monde’s journal-
ists (Manach, 2013). He also stressed that many of Le
Monde’s claims, which quoted some of his own reports
on the DGSE’s so-called “Frenchelon” program, were in
fact not new and had been documented before.
Manach was right. By then, officials from the DGSE
had already hinted at the formidable growth of the
agency’s Internet surveillance capabilities. In 2010, its
Chief Technology Officer, Bernard Barbier, who was then
supervising the plan agreed upon in Sarkozy’s office two
years earlier, boasted during a public talk before the
Cryptographers’ Reserve that France was in the “first
division” of communications intelligence. He also re-
vealed that the Internet was now the DGSE’s “main tar-
get” (Manach, 2010). Then, in March 2013, just a few
weeks before the beginning of the Snowden disclosures,
the head of the DGSE was even less equivocal, admit-
ting before the National Assembly that, since 2008, “we
have been able to develop a significant plan for the
surveillance of Internet traffic” (French National Assem-
bly, 2013).
3.3. Advocacy Failure
This, in turn begs the question of why, in the immediate
aftermath of the Snowden disclosures and even prior to
that, it took so long for human rights groups in France
to pick up on the pieces of information already available
and go after these illegal surveillance operations, both in
courts and in policy-making arenas.
The question is a complex one, and cannot be fully ad-
dressed here. But two aspects deserve to be mentioned.
First, regarding strategic litigation, it is worth noting that
in the French civil law system, legal opportunities have tra-
ditionally been lacking (Meili, 1998), especially in a field
such as state surveillance covered by state secrets. State-
ments by officials are not enough to initiate legal action.
In other countries like the US, they might help trigger suc-
cessful “FOIA requests” (named after the 1966 Freedom
of Information Act) (Schulhofer, 2015). In France how-
ever, the national “freedom of information” law adopted
in 1978 has extremely broad national security exemp-
tions and is generally much weaker (for instance, the re-
quest must specify the exact name of the documents
sought after, which represents a formidable hurdle in pol-
icy areas covered by state secrets) (Chevallier, 1992).
Second, and more importantly, the lack of mobilisa-
tion prior and in the immediate aftermath of the first
Snowden disclosures speaks about the structural weak-
nesses of online privacy advocacy in France, at least un-
til late 2013. Even when in October 2013, thanks to the
Snowden trove, Le Monde revealed the existence of the
so-called LUSTRE data-sharing agreement between the
NSA and the DGSE, showing that the latter sent millions
of metadata records daily to the US agency (Follorou,
2013), human rights advocacy groups did not pick up on
the issue.
A few hypotheses, based on observant-participation
conducted in this advocacy field, can be offered to ex-
plain these structural weaknesses. Though there have
been recent and successful episodes of contention
against offline surveillance and intelligence files, Inter-
net surveillance has mostly remained out of the focus
of large human rights organisations and smaller digital
rights groups in the past decade, which may be due to
the particular interests of their staff and subsequent pri-
oritisation in handling their limited resources. Also, a gen-
eral knowledge of the field in the US, the UK or Germany
suggests that historical factors, more recent legalisation
processes and leaks regarding Internet surveillance pro-
grams likely played an important role in helping civil soci-
ety groups in these countriesmaintain stronger networks
and expertise.
One major moment of the transnational post-
Snowden contention, for instance, was the release of the
“International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance” in May 2014
(EFF, 2014). Although framed as a key response of the
global civil society to the Snowden controversies, the
work on this text started as early as 2012 and, as noted
in the document, “more than 40 privacy and security ex-
perts participated in the drafting process”. However, ac-
cording to one interview conducted for this article with a
lawyerwho played amajor role in the drafting of this doc-
ument, there wasn’t any French national among them.
This tends to confirm that, until recently, French NGOs
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had remained outside of these transnational networks
working on state surveillance.
3.4. Legalisation of Metadata Access Sparks Contention
These structural weaknesses of anti-surveillance advo-
cacy in France help explain why intelligence policy-
makers would try to legalise very intrusive metadata ac-
cess powers as early as October 2013, in the midst of the
Snowden scandal.
In 2006, a law had been adopted to give intelli-
gence agencies access to metadata records held by ac-
cess providers and hosting providers, but only for fighting
terrorism.What ismore, from2009 on, intelligence agen-
cies had apparently experimented with traffic-scanning
devices provided by Qosmos and installed on the in-
frastructure of the few major telecom operators to
monitor metadata in real-time (Hourdeaux, 2016; Re-
flets.info, 2016).
Already in late-2012, it was becoming clear to intelli-
gence policy experts that—in line with what had already
been alluded to in the 2008 White Paper of Defence—
these crucial capabilities for expanded and real-time ac-
cess to metadata needed to be secured. Despite public
discussions on the matter in Parliament at the time, no-
body in the advocacy sphere apparently took notice.
In August 2013, Prime Minister Manuel Valls pre-
sented the 2014–2019 Military Planning Bill (Loi de Pro-
grammation Militaire, or LPM). Over the course of the
parliamentary debate, and in particular when the Sen-
ate adopted amendments to the Bill in first reading in
October 2013, the law became the vehicle for a partial
legalisation of the new capabilities. We were just four
months after the first Snowden disclosures, and again no
human rights organisation reacted. Six weeks later how-
ever, an industry group representing online social ser-
vices including Google France, AOL, eBay, Facebook, Mi-
crosoft, Skype and French companies like Deezer or Dai-
lymotion published an article against the reform (Asso-
ciation des Services Internet Communautaires, 2013). It
was only then that human rights groups understood the
importance of this provision and mounted a last-minute
effort to get the provision out of the bill.
Coming at a very late stage of the legislative proce-
dure, the effort eventually failed to strike out the pro-
vision. But despite this failure and a somewhat exag-
gerated denunciation of “generalised surveillance,” this
first episode of post-Snowden contention had at last
led to the mobilisation of civil society groups around
Internet surveillance issues, one which benefited from
widespread media coverage. Frustrated by their failure
to react in time (before rather than after industry groups)
and also finally realising the need to build and share ex-
pertise around Internet surveillance and digital rights in
general, human rights groups created a new umbrella or-
ganisation. Announced on the international “data protec-
tion day” in January 2014, it was called the Observatoire
des Libertés et du Numérique (OLN).
OLN’s initial members included organisations that of-
ten worked together on non-Internet issues—including
the Human Rights League, a lawyers’ union (Syndicat des
Avocats de France) and a judges’ union (Syndicat de la
Magistrature). They were joined by two smaller research
organisations devoted to the interplay of the digital tech-
nologies and privacy (CECIL and CREIS-Terminal). A few
days later, LQDN—with its already established expertise
on digital rights, its singular Internet-inspired political cul-
ture as well as its own international networks (Breindl,
2011)—, asked to join the coalition.
This brokerage of new connections between French
human rights NGOs would play a key role against the In-
telligence Bill. But in the meantime, the government ap-
parently slowed the path to legalisation set forth by Ur-
voas in its recent reports. Post-Snowden contention was
finally under way in France, and it was likely perceived
to make any significant intelligence reform much more
politically risky. At least in the short term.
4. A Long-Awaited Legalisation: Passing the 2015
Intelligence Act
Soon, with the spectacular rise of the threat posed by
the Islamic State (Giroux, 2014) and the Paris attacks of
January 2015, “securitisation” discourses helped create
the adequate political conditions for the passage of the
Intelligence Act—the most extensive piece of legislation
ever adopted in France to regulate the work of intelli-
gence agencies.
Securitisation is understood in critical security stud-
ies as “speech acts through which an intersubjective un-
derstanding is constructed within a political community
to treat something as an existential threat to a valued
referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and ex-
ceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan &
Wæver, 2003, p. 491). In the field of terrorism, these are
of course not new. And by the time the Intelligence Bill
was introduced, anti-terrorism was already back on the
top of the political agenda in France, with the looming
threat coming from the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.
In July 2014, just as the government was introduc-
ing a new anti-terrorism bill before the Parliament, Presi-
dent François Hollande convened a National Intelligence
Council at the Élysée Palace. In the laconic press-release
issued on that day, the Council claimed to have “deter-
mined the strategic priorities of [intelligence] services
and approved the legal, technical and human resources
necessary to carry on these priorities” (French Presi-
dency, 2014). The debate on the anti-terrorism bill, fi-
nally adopted on November 2014, also gave an opportu-
nity to OLNmembers to engage in their first coordinated
action against the law’s new restrictions on freedom of
expression online.
But on January 25th 2015, then Prime Minister
Manuel Valls turned the long-awaited intelligence re-
form into an essential part of the government’s po-
litical response to the Paris attacks carried on earlier
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that month. With the country under shock, Valls pre-
sented yet another package of “exceptional measures”
that formed part of the government’s proclaimed “gen-
eral mobilisation against terrorism”. (French Govern-
ment, 2015). He announced his government would soon
present a new bill, which he said was “necessary to
strengthen the legal capacity of intelligence agencies to
act,” alluding to “Djihadist Internet communications”.
The Paris attacks only reinforced the ongoing trend
toward securitisation, helping to locate the fight against
terrorism—and the instrumental role of communications
surveillance in that respect—beyond the domain of nor-
mal, democratic politics. Securitisation would for in-
stance justify the government’s choice to present the bill
to Parliament using a fast-track procedure, allowing only
one ruling in each of the Parliament’s chambers. In sum
securitisation was effectively added to denials as rhetor-
ical strategies aimed at dealing with post-Snowden con-
tention, and finally pass a legal basis for what were until
then illegal security practices.
4.1. The Intelligence Act’s Main Provisions on Internet
Surveillance
During the expeditious parliamentary debate that en-
sued (April–June 2015), the bill’s proponents never
missed an opportunity to stress, as Valls did while pre-
senting the text to the National Assembly, that the new
law had “nothing to do with the practices revealed by
Edward Snowden”. Distinction strategies notwithstand-
ing, the Act’s provisions actually demonstrate how im-
portant the sort of practices revealed by Snowden have
become for the geopolitical “arms race” in communica-
tions intelligence.
The Intelligence Act creates whole new sections in
the Code of Internal Security. It starts off by widening the
scope of public-interest motives for which surveillance
can be authorised. Besides terrorism, economic intelli-
gence, organised crime and counter-espionage, it now in-
cludes vague notions such as the promotion of “major in-
terests in foreign policy” or the prevention of “collective
violence likely to cause serious harm to public peace”. As
for the number of agencies allowed to use this new le-
gal basis for extra-judicial surveillance, it comprises the
“second circle” of law enforcement agencies that are not
part of the official “intelligence community” and whose
combined staff is well over 45,000.
In terms of technical capabilities, the Act seeks to har-
monise the range of tools that intelligence agencies can
use on the regime applicable to judicial investigations.
These include targeted telephone and Internet wiretaps,
access to metadata and geotagging records as well as
computer intrusion and exploitation (i.e. “hacking”). But
the Act also authorises techniques that directly echo the
large-scale surveillance practices at the heart of post-
Snowden controversies. Such is the case of the so-called
“black boxes”, these scanning devices that will use Big
Data techniques to sort through Internet traffic in order
to detect “weak signals” of terrorism (intelligence offi-
cials have given the example of encryption as the sort
of things these black boxes would be looking for).
Another provision limited to anti-terrorism allows for
the real-time collection of metadata. Initially, the provi-
sion targeted only individuals “identified as a [terrorist]
threat”. After the 2016 Nice attack, it was extended to
cover individuals “likely related to a threat” or who sim-
ply belong to “the entourage” of individuals “likely re-
lated to a threat”. In theory, tens of thousands of peo-
ple could fall under this definition, and have their meta-
data collected in real-time during a renewable period of
four months.
Similarly, there is a whole chapter on “international
surveillance”,which legalises themassive programmede-
ployed by the DGSE since 2008 to tap into international
cables. Like in other countries, the underlying logic of
this article breaches the universality of human rights:
communications crossing French borders can be inter-
cepted and analysed “in bulk” with lesser safeguards
than those applicable to domestic surveillance. However,
the transnational nature of the Internet makes it very
likely that the communications of French citizens and
residents massively end up in the DGSE’s nets, despite
a pledge for procedures of so-called “technical minimi-
sation” aimed at protecting communications related to
“French technical identifiers” (e.g. French IP addresses).
The Act also grants blanket immunity to intelligence
officers who carry on computer crimes into computer
systems located abroad, which again will directly affect
many French Internet users. The provision may contra-
vene Article 32(b) of the Budapest Convention on Cy-
bercrime on the trans-border access to computer data
(Cybercrime Convention Committee, 2014). This provi-
sion speaks to the fact that, with encryption on the rise
since 2013, the capability to massively penetrate end-
points through hacking is becoming a focus point for in-
telligence agencies (e.g. UK Home Office, 2016).
As for oversight, as it has been the case since the
1991 Wiretapping Act, all national surveillance activi-
ties are authorised by the Prime Minister. A revamped
oversight commission (the CNCTR) composed of judges
and members of Parliament has 24 hours to issue non-
binding opinions on authorisation requests. The main in-
novation of the Intelligence Act is the creation of a new
redress mechanism before the Conseil d’Etat (France’s
Supreme Court for administrative law), but the proce-
dure is veiled in secrecy and fails to respect defence
rights, which again echoes the law of the US and the
UK (Bigo, Carrera, Hernanz, & Scherrer, 2014). Interna-
tional surveillance will remain completely outside of this
redress procedure.
Among other notable provisions, one forbids the
oversight body from reviewing communications data ob-
tained from foreign agencies. The law also fails to provide
any framework to regulate (and limit) access to the col-
lected intelligence once it is stored by intelligence and
law enforcement agencies, thereby running counter to
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recent rulings by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) (Woods, 2016).
4.2. Mobilisation Against the Controversial French
Intelligence Bill
By the time the Intelligence Bill was debated in Parlia-
ment, in April 2015, human rights organisations partner-
ing in OLN had built the kind of networking and exper-
tise that made themmore suited to campaign against na-
tional security legislation.
They led the contention during the three-month-long
parliamentary debate on the Bill, acting as the core of
a network of actors typical of post-Snowden contention
(see Figure 2), including international partners in the
NGO world, groups of scientists, engineers and hacker
groups, French independent companies from the digital
sector, and even a few security experts (including for-
mer intelligence analysts or a former anti-terrorist judge).
These actors also received backing from leading national
and international human rights organisations (data pro-
tection agency, Council of Europe, UN special rappor-
teurs, etc.).
Interestingly, to the contrary of the full-fledged con-
tention waged in the US or the UK, large US technol-
ogy firms like Google or Microsoft declined to engage
in the French debate, perhaps out of fear for being cor-
nered for their double-speak on privacy and antagonising
French officials, who regularly accused them of engaging
in intrusive forms of commercial surveillance. As for their
French competitors, like telecommunications companies
Orange, SFR and others, their even greater dependence
on and proximity with the state political elite probably
explain why they chose to remain neutral bystanders.
Overall, contention played an important role in bar-
ring amendments that would have given intelligence
agencies even more leeway than originally afforded by
the bill. Whereas the government hoped for a union
sacrée, contention also managed to fracture the initial
display of unanimity. MPs from across the political spec-
trum (including several within both socialist and conser-
vative ranks) fought against the bill, pushing its propo-
nents to amend the text in order to bring significant safe-
guards compared to the government’s proposal. How-
ever, the general philosophy of the text remained intact.
In June 2015, the bill was eventually adopted with 438
votes in favour, 86 against and 42 abstentions at the Na-
tional Assembly and 252 for, 67 against and 26 absten-
tions at the Senate.
The implementation decrees were adopted by the
government between October 2015 and February 2016,
giving civil society opponents a two-month window to
introduce several important legal challenges before the
Council of State which are, at the time of writing, still
pending. Other legal challenges have been introduced
before the ECHR.
5. Conclusion: Facing the Snowden Paradox
The first Snowden disclosures and the global scandal that
followed held the promise of an upcoming rollback of the
techno-legal apparatus developed by the NSA, the GCHQ
and their counterparts to intercept and analyse large por-
tions of the world’s Internet traffic. State secrets and the
“plausible deniability” doctrine often used by these se-
cretive organisations could no longer stand in the face of
such overwhelming documentation. Intelligence reform,
one could then hope, would soon be put on the agenda
to relocate these surveillance programmes within the
boundaries of the rule of law.
Almost four years later, however, what were then





















Figure 2. Web cartography of actors mobilised against the French Intelligence Bill. Explore the network online at the fol-
lowing address: https://is.gd/cLkzqh
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ligence reform is being passed, but mainly to secure the
legal basis for large-scale surveillance to a degree of de-
tail that was hard to imagine just a few years ago. Despite
unprecedented mobilisations against surveillance prac-
tices developed in the shadows of the “deep state”, the
latter are progressively being legalised. Hence the Snow-
den paradox.
France was the first liberal regime to engage in
a sweeping, post-Snowden intelligence reform. There,
even prior to 2013, the legal pressure exerted by hu-
man rights standards, and their application by suprana-
tional courts like the ECHR, had already triggered a slow
process of legalisation. Post-Snowden contention only
made that pressure stronger, pushing intelligence policy-
makers to secure and expand the surveillance capabil-
ities of their agencies through intelligence reform, as
soon as the political conditions seemed ripe.
While it would be tempting to see the Intelligence
Act of 2015 as part of a certain French tradition when it
comes to regulating the Internet (Mailland, 2001; Meyer
& Audenhove, 2012; Tréguer, 2015), the situation in
other countries suggests that the French case is part
of a wider trend. In the Fall of 2016, the British Par-
liament passed the much-criticised Investigatory Pow-
ers Bill (Hintz & Dencik, 2016). Simultaneously in Ger-
many, amendments to the so-called “G-10 law” were
adopted to validate the large-scale surveillance powers
of the country’s foreign intelligence agency, the BND—
also embroiled in the NSA scandal (Wetzling, 2016). In
the Netherlands, an ongoing intelligence reform is rais-
ing similar concerns, while the reform of the US PATRIOT
Act in June 2015 was extremely modest. Detailed cross-
country comparisons are of course warranted. But de-
spite important variations between these countries—for
instance regarding the initial weaknesses and strengths
of privacy advocacy in these different national contexts,
or the role played by large US Internet firms in policy
debates—, these other instances of post-Snowden intelli-
gence reform seem to confirm the existence of the Snow-
den paradox.
Fifteen years after 9/11, which brought an abrupt
end to the controversy on the NSA’s ECHELON program
(Campbell, 2000) and paved the way for the adoption of
the PATRIOT Act in the US and similar legislation else-
where, the threat of terrorism and associated processes
of securitisation are hindering the global episode of con-
tention opened by Edward Snowden. Securitisation cre-
ates a “chilling effect” on civil society contention, making
legalisation politically possible and leading to a “ratchet
effect” in the development of previously illegal security
practices or, more generally, of executive powers. In that
regard, post-Snowden intelligence reform stands as a
stark reminder of the fact that, once coupled with se-
curitisation, “a-legality” and national security become
two convenient excuses for legalisation and impunity,
allowing states to navigate the legal and political con-
straints created by human rights organisations and insti-
tutional pluralism.
During the debate on the French Intelligence Act,
Urvoas stressed that the law was neither Schmitt’s nor
Agamben’s states of exception (Urvoas, 2013b). But be-
cause it is “legal” or includes some oversight and redress
mechanisms does not mean that large-scale surveillance
and secret procedures do not represent a formidable
challenge to the rule of law. Rather than a state of ex-
ception, legalisation carried on under the guise of the
raison d’État amounts to what Sidney Tarrow calls “rule
by law”. In his comparative study of the relationships be-
tween states, wars and contention, he writes of the US
“war on terror”:
Is the distinction between rule of law and rule by
law a distinction without difference? I think not.
First, rule by law convinces both decision makers and
operatives that their illegal behavior is legally pro-
tected….Second, engaging in rule by law provides a
defense against the charge they are breaking the law.
Over time, and repeated often enough, this can cre-
ate a “new normal”, or at least a new content for
long-legitimated symbols of the American creed. Fi-
nally, “legalizing” illegality draws resources and en-
ergies away from other forms of contention. (2015,
pp. 165–166)
The same process is happening with regards to present-
day state surveillance: the suspicionless interception
of communications, “big data” preventive policing and
large-scale computer hacking are becoming the new nor-
mal in intelligence practices. At this point in time, it
seems difficult to argue that post-Snowden contention
has hindered in any significant and lasting way the
formidable growth of surveillance capabilities of the
world’s most powerful intelligence agencies.
And yet, while the current trend of legalisation is es-
pecially worrying considering the ongoing illiberal drift
in Western democracies, the jury is still out. Besides le-
galisation, Post-Snowden contention is having another
major outcome: new coordination in civil society both
nationally and globally, with the formation of a transna-
tional movement against Internet surveillance (Tarrow,
2016). This emerging movement has been document-
ing Internet surveillance like never before, undermining
some of the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence field
and hinders its democratic accountability. It has provided
fresh political and legal arguments to reclaim privacy as a
“part of the common good” (Lyon, 2015, p. 9), and helped
push for the proliferation of legal and policy recommen-
dations regarding the compliance of surveillancewith hu-
man rights.
Most crucially, this emerging privacy movement has
led courts—in particular the ECHR and the CJEU—to con-
sider cases of historic importance that, in the long run,
could prove to be game-changers. Strategic litigation has
indeed the potential of turning the Snowden paradox on
its head, that is to use these new laws—and the new legal
opportunities it brings to privacy advocates—to counter
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the surveillance practices that legalisation sought to le-
gitimise in the first place.
Judges now appear as the last institutional resort
against large-scale surveillance. If court actions fail, the
only possibility left for resistance will lie in what would
by then represent a most transgressive form of political
action: democratising the use of strong encryption, and
subverting the centralised and commodified technical ar-
chitecture that made such surveillance possible in the
first place.
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